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Abstract 
The conclusion of a (re)marriage is required to be made in one of the three modes 
of celebration under the Revised Family Code. Despite the legal significance of the 
celebration of a (re)marriage as a decisive element in the conclusion and proof of 
the (re)marriage, the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court decided a 
case in which the post-divorce non-marital cohabitation between ex-spouses was 
considered to constitute a remarriage. In the decision, the court essentially over-
looked the need for proof of the celebration of the remarriage. The author argues 
that the decision contradicts with the relevant legal rules. Thus, this case comment 
attempts to make a critical analysis of the various legal issues involved in the case 
at different levels with particular emphasis on the decision of the Cassation Divi-
sion. In the analysis, the author argues that a post-divorce non-marital cohabita-
tion would not amount to a remarriage between the ex-spouses. The reason is that 
the conclusion of the alleged remarriage between the ex-spouses would be pre-
sumed only upon proof of its celebration in a certain form under the Revised Fami-
ly Code.  
_____________________ 
Keywords: cohabitation, celebration, divorce, irregular union, marriage, proof, 
remarriage 
I.INTRODUCTORY  NOTE 
The role of the Federal Supreme Court in contributing to a uniform applica-
tion of the laws in Ethiopia is growing significantly following the recent legislative 
adoption of the doctrine of precedent with national scope of application.
1
 As the 
                                                          
*LL.B(Haramaya University, Ethiopia); LL.M(MIPLC/Augsburg University, Germany); 
PGD(University of Stellenbosch, South Africa); Assistant Professor, Haramaya University College of 
Law, Ethiopia. The author is thankful to the anonymous external assessors for their comments. He 
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1 The doctrine of precedent has its origin in the Anglo-American legal system. As such, the doc-
trine is known for the binding nature of the precedent set by any superior court on subordinate or 
lower courts. This doctrine had formally found its way into Ethiopia in 1962 when it received a legis-
lative backing for the first time. The doctrine was later limited in its scope since 1993 following a 
legislation which provided for the decision of the Central Supreme Court alone to be binding on the 
subordinate courts. As opposed to its predecessors, the current rule of precedent as embodied in the 
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court renders binding interpretations of laws enacted at federal and state levels, the 
rule of precedent commands a nationwide application by all judicial organs in the 
country. The various precedents set by the Cassation Division of the Federal Su-
preme Court would entail a far-reaching legal and practical consequence on the 
administration of fair justice.  
Though the court’s legal sphere of influence encompasses all legal matters in 
the entire domains of the laws in the country, the frequency and variety of cases 
that trigger legal interpretations by the Cassation Division vary from one area of 
the law to the other. In this regard, one may notice the frequency of cases on crim-
inal matters, contracts, labor, property, family as well as procedural matters. Yet, 
family matters constitute a significant number of the cassation decisions of the 
court as published in a series of its volumes. In other words, family laws are 
among the various areas of the laws that are subject to the continuous and exten-
sive practice of binding interpretations of the laws by the Cassation Division. 
Nonetheless, the practice that is meant to avoid basic errors in the interpretation of 
the laws as such is not immune to errors and misconstruction in its application. The 
instances of the possible flaws are evidenced by a case at hand calling for a critical 
case comment. Hence, this case comment attempts to bring into light some basic 
errors and misconstructions in the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions of 
the Revised Family Code with regard to conclusion and proof of a marriage.  
Therefore, in this case comment, some pertinent legal issues will be critically 
analyzed in light of the issues involved in the case. To this end, the case comment 
begins with a brief exposition of the relevant basic legal principles to lay down a 
legal framework for the subsequent analysis of the case at various levels. Part II of 
this piece will present a succinct summary of facts of the case as it arose before the 
lower court. Treated in the Part III are rulings and reasoning of the courts as the 
subsequent critique will touch upon each of the decisions of all the courts on the 
case. There are a number of pertinent legal issues at each level that merit legal 
analysis. Part IV is devoted to an extensive critical analysis of the rulings and rea-
soning of the courts with emphasis on the cassation decision in light of the relevant 
legal provisions. Part V concludes the analysis and hint at the need to adhere to the 
true purpose and spirit of the law in the interpretation of the law where the latter 
calls for it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Proc. No. 454/2005 is applicable only for the decision of the Federal Supreme Court in its cassation 
division. See A Proclamation to Re-amend the Federal Courts Proclamation No. 25/96, Proclamation 
No. 454/2005, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 11th Year, No.42, Addis Ababa, 14th June 2005; see also 
Hussien Ahmed Tura, Uniform Application of Law in Ethiopia: Effects of Cassation Decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court, 7 AFR. J.  LEGAL STUD. 203, 213-214(2014).  
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A. Conclusion of a Marriage 
Marriage is a formal marital relation that comes into existence upon its con-
clusion. The conclusion of a marriage is marked by its celebration in accordance 
with the form prescribed by the Revised Family Code. To this end, the law pro-
vides three forms of celebrating marriage.
2
 Based on the forms, marriage can be 
referred to as civil, religious or customary marriage. It should be noted that this 
distinction is solely based on the modes of celebration. In other words, there is on-
ly one kind of marriage.
3
 Indeed, marriage is the only institution of its kind
4
 de-
spite the existence of varying forms for its celebration. As a result, the essential re-
quirements for the conclusion of a valid marriage are all the same for all forms of 
marriage.
5
 Nor does there exist any difference in their legal effects.
6
 Thus, the dif-
ference lies only in form, not in substance.  
                                                          
2 Ethiopia, THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Proclamation No.213/2000, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 6th 
Year, Extraordinary Issue No.1, Addis Ababa, 4th July 2000 [hereinafter, THE REVISED FAMILY 
CODE], Arts.1-4. For those who are not well familiar with the current legal system in Ethiopia, it is 
important to mention the fact that all the nine regional states in Ethiopia are constitutionally empow-
ered to enact their own regional family laws. Most regional states have already enacted their respec-
tive family codes. The Revised Family Code is thus applicable only in the Federal city administra-
tions, namely: Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Nota Bene: Unless indicated otherwise, references to 
legal provisions in this case comment are all made to the Revised Family Code. 
3 It is worth noting that the terms “kinds” and “forms,” as used under relevant family laws, are 
quite distinct in their meaning. While the former tends to suggest the types of marriage, the latter re-
fers to the modes of its celebration. Thus, the usage of the word “forms” under art.1 of the Revised 
Family Code signifies the different modes of celebration for the same “kind” of marriage. They are 
not meant to be used interchangeably.  Indeed, distinction can be noted from the heading under art.1 
of the Code that runs as “various forms of marriage” instead of using the corresponding phrase “vari-
ous kinds of marriages” as was used under the Civil Code of Ethiopia. See CIVIL CODE OF THE EMPIRE 
OF ETHIOPIA, PROC. NO.165/1960, NEGARIT GAZETA, GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY, 19th Year, No.2, Ad-
dis Ababa, 5th May,1960,  art.557[hereinafter, CIVIL CODE]. In changing the terminology, it was felt 
that using the phrase with “kinds” deceptively appears to imply more than one types of marriage. In 
terms of their legal effects, all forms of marriage remain the same. Hence, there is only one kind of 
marriage that can be celebrated in one of the three forms. See Mehari Redai፣የተሻሻለዉን የቤተሰብ 
ሕግ ለመገንዘብ የሚረዱ አንዳንድ ነጥቦች፣ ቅጽ አንድ ፣ ሁለተኛ እትም፣ 2000 ዓ.ም[Some Points for the 
Understanding of the REVISED FAMILY LAW], vol.1, at 13(2nd ed.2010).  
4 See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW, 38 (2nd ed.  2004). 
5 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, art. 25(2), 26(2) &27(2). There is no exception for the essential 
conditions on the basis of the forms of marriage under the Revised Family Code and other regional 
family laws. That is, a certain religion cannot prescribe any substantive requirement that contradicts 
with or supersedes the essential conditions required by the law. See also Mehari Redai, supra note 3, 
at 15. To this date, only the family code of Harari regional state exceptionally permits the conclusion 
of a bigamous marriage on a religious ground. The Code contemplates a special permission to be 
granted by the concerned organ in the region. However, the organ that is competent to give the spe-
cial permission is not clear. Nor is it clear whether or not the conclusion of the marriage shall be 
made in accordance with the religious mode of celebration. Indeed, the exception may not necessarily 
be limited to religious form of marriage as long as the exception is justified by the religious ground. 
See HARARI REGIONAL FAMILY CODE, PROC. NO. 80/2008, HARARI NEGARI GAZETA, EXTRA ORDINARY 
ISSUE No. 1/2008, Harar, 13th July, 2008, Art. 11(2). 
6 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 40. 
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A marriage is concluded upon its celebration in one of the three forms. Ac-
cordingly, a civil marriage is concluded before an officer of civil status who 
would, after verifying the compliance with the essential conditions, pronounce the 
spouses to be united in a bond of marriage.
7
 The declaration by the officer shall be 
made in the presence of four witnesses.
8
 Thus, the celebration of a civil marriage is 
supposed to be made in accordance with the procedures prescribed by the law.
9
 In 
contrast, a marriage is considered to be a religious marriage when it is concluded 
in accordance with the religion of the spouse(s).
10
 The procedures for its conclu-
sion would be prescribed by the concerned religion.
11
 The conclusion of a religious 
marriage is thus signified by the observance of the procedures or religious rites 
dictated by the religion. The celebration of a religious marriage that does not con-
form to the essential procedures may fail to evidence the conclusion of the mar-
riage.
12
 For the marriage to be formally celebrated as such, its celebration shall not 
deviate from the procedures deemed essential by the religion. Conclusion of a mar-
riage is pronounced by its celebration that is defined by the concerned form.  
Marriage is a legal relation that differs from a factual romantic union. In some 
jurisdiction such as the UK, lack of ceremony for the alleged marriage would con-
stitute non-marriage.
13
 In Ethiopia, it remains unclear. It is argued that it would not 
make the marriage inexistent.
14
 Yet, its practical effect is inextricably unavoidable. 
In some cases, the very conclusion may not possibly be traced to any form. It must 
be borne in mind that this is not an issue of validity. The defect in the form does 
not render a marriage void or voidable. Validity of a marriage is not determined by 
its form.
15
 Rather, the issue at bar is the very conclusion of the marriage in the said 
form. It is a factual issue with immediate legal consequence. In reality, this creates 
a problem when its conclusion is contested and there is no indication of its celebra-
tion.  
                                                          
7 Id. Art. 25(6). 
8 Id. Art. 25(1). 
9 Id. Art. 2 & 25. 
10 Id. Art. 3 & 26(1). 
11 Id. Art. 26(1). 
12  In Ethiopia, the existing family laws including the Revised Family Code are mute on this is-
sue. No precedent has been set in this regard to fill in the apparent vacuum. In UK, for instance, fol-
lowing a court decision in 2001, a marriage that is not celebrated in accordance with the forms pre-
scribed by the Marriage Act of 1947 is considered non-existent rather than void.  See Rebecca 
Robert, CRETNEY’S FAMILY LAW 33 (6th ed. 2006). 
13 Id. 
14 See Katherine O’Donovan, Void and Voidable Marriages in Ethiopian Law, 8 J. ETH. L. 2 
(451), 452 (1972). It is important to note here that the issue of non-marriage was understood by 
O’Donovan to mean void despite the existence of different views on the distinction. Id. at 451-452. 
15 This can be drawn, by analogy, from the reading of arts.38-39 of THE REVISED FAMILY CODE. 
Moreover, the Revised Family Code does not provide for invalidation of customary or religious mar-
riage for want of the required formalities. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are quite clear on 
this point. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, Art. 623.   
18-May-159:49 AM 
Fall 2014]                    A Post-Divorce Cohabitation Never Equals A Remarriage                              81 
By the same token, celebration of a customary marriage would be made in ac-
cordance with the custom of the community to which the spouse(s) belong or 
wherein they reside.
16
 The celebration would constitute the conclusion of the mar-
riage when the required customary rites are so observed. In this regard, it is suffi-
cient to constitute celebration of a marriage as long as the practice recognized by 
the concerned custom is complied with.  
Therefore, a marriage is said to be concluded only when its mode of celebra-
tion conforms to one of the prescribed forms of a marriage. An alleged conclusion 
of a marriage that fails to fit one of the forms is deemed inexistent in the eyes of 
the law. Celebration is the distinctive feature of a marriage that it marks the begin-
ning of the existence of the marriage. The public nature of a marriage requires a 
formal entry.
17
 It is not a mere emotional intimacy created by and for the couple.
18
  
One may wonder about the legal and practical significance of celebration of a 
marriage as such. Indeed, the legal significance of a form of a marriage is mani-
fold. First, the celebration of a marriage in accordance with the form marks the be-
ginning of its legal existence. It is the celebration that pronounces the conclusion 
of the marriage. Following its pronounced conclusion, the marriage begins to pro-
duce the legal effects of a marriage.
19
 Second, the celebration of a marriage is an 
important element in distinguishing a marriage from an irregular union for all legal 
purposes. It has remained the distinguishing feature of a marriage throughout histo-
ry.
20
 As explained below, formation of an irregular union does not require any 
form of celebration.
21
 Nor does its legal effect depend on a certain mode of cele-
bration. Third, celebration of a marriage is quite important in the subsequent proof 
of a marriage. This is one of the most common instances that bring into picture the 
issue of conclusion of an alleged marriage.
22
 Proof of a marriage may be necessi-
tated for various reasons such as ascertainment of filiation,
23










                                                          
16 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 4 &27(1). 
17 Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage for? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. 
REV. 3(773), 778(2002). 
18  Id. at 775. 
19 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 28(3). 
20 The Formalities Essential to a Valid Marriage in Indiana, 34 IND.  L. J. 4 (644), 646 (1959). 
21 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Arts. 98 & 99(1). 
22 In principle, proof of the alleged marriage calls for proof of its conclusion or celebration in a 
certain form. See Yeshareg Abatkun v. Mesert Admasu, Federal Supreme Court, Cass. File 
No.33875/2008, 5 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS. 262, 262-267(2009). 
23 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, art. 125(1) &126.  Ascertainment of paternal filiation based on 
legal presumption of paternity depends on existence of a marriage between the presumed father and 
the woman that gave birth to the child. 
24 In order to claim the pecuniary effects of a certain marriage, the marriage shall be proved be-
forehand.  This is so as effects of a marriage do not exist without the actual existence of the alleged 
marriage.  
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etc. In all cases, the conclusion or existence of a marriage may be at issue. Thus, 
proof of the marriage requires proving its conclusion in one of the three forms dis-
cussed above in this piece.
28
 As is treated in depth below, proof of a marriage can 
be made either by marriage certificate or possession of status. It must be noted that 
a marriage certificate issued by the officer has to indicate the mode of the celebra-
tion of the marriage.
29
 Fourth, celebration of a marriage as an integral part of proof 




B. Formation of an Irregular Union 
An irregular union is a state of fact recognized by the law.
31
 The state of fact 
is created upon the cohabitation of a man and a woman as husband and wife.
32
 As 
such, its formation does not require any formal procedure. Though the law partly 
prescribes (explicitly or implicitly)
33
 for applicability of the essential conditions of 
                                                                                                                                                   
25 Proof of marriage is required by the surviving spouse to claim 50% of the pension allowance 
following the death of the other spouse. See A Proclamation to Provide for Public Servants’ Pension, 
Proc. No. 714/2011, FED. NEGARIT GAZETA, 17th Year, No.78, Addis Ababa, 24th June, 2011, art.41. 
See also Social Security Agency v. Woletebirhan Kassaye, Federal Supreme Court, Cass. File 
No.20036/2006, 5 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS. 362, 362-363(2009). Proof of marriage may also be 
equally important to terminate payment of the allowance where the surviving spouse is alleged to 
have concluded a new marriage. See also Muluworke Watche v. Social Security Agency, Federal Su-
preme Court, Cass. File No.52569/2010, 11 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS. 40, 40-41(2011). 
26 See COMMERCIAL CODE OF THE EMPIRE OF ETHIOPIA, PROC.NO.166/1960, NEGARIT GAZETA, 
Gazette Extraordinary , 19th Year No.3, Addis Ababa, 5th May,1960,  Art.701(1)(a). The spouse of 
the deceased is deemed a beneficiary of the life insurance even when s/he is not specified by name in 
the insurance policy.  
27 The compensatory benefit is claimed by a spouse as a survivor upon the death of the spouse 
due to employment injury or due to other ground. The spouse is thus expected to establish her status 
to claim the compensation. See Federal Civil Servants Proc. No.515/2007, Arts. 55(4) & 86(2). 
28 See also Beletu Ashami v. G/Tsadik Workineh, Civ. App. File No.714/80(EC), SELECTED 
JUDGMENTS OF SUPREME COURT OF ETHIOPIA, Civil Cases, Vol.2, AAU Faculty of Law, March 2000. 
In the case, the then Supreme Court emphasized that proof of celebration of the marriage in one of 
the forms is required for proof of an alleged marriage. Otherwise, proof of other elements of posses-
sion of marital status excluding celebration would only amount to an irregular union. 
29 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 30(c) . 
30 Id. Art.11. See also THE CRIMINAL CODE OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 
PROC.NO.414/2004, FED. NEGARIT GAZETTE, Year No.9, May 2005[hereinafter, the Criminal Code], 
Art. 650(1). In order to establish the crime of bigamy under the Criminal Code, the existence of a 
preceding bond of marriage shall be proved for the subsequent marriage to constitute bigamy under 
the Revised Family Code. 
31 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 98. Compare the Civil Code, supra note 3, Art. 708. An ir-
regular union is an age-old practice in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, a better legal protection of its basic le-
gal effects has been recognized in the Revised Family Code. See Tilahun Teshome, Ethiopia: Reflec-
tions on the Revised Family Code of 2000, 2002 INT’L SURV. FAM. L.1, 16(2002). 
32 Id. 
33 For instance, affinity is explicitly indicated under Art.100(2) of the Revised Family Code. It 
can also be inferred from the very nature of the relation as a juridical act that age and free and full 
consent are required to be satisfied for a valid irregular union. Moreover, prohibition of consanguini-
ty could also be considered an essential condition as sexual relations between persons related by 
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marriage for an irregular union, it does not stipulate for any form to mark its com-
mencement.
34
 That is, no celebration in any mode is required to signify its for-
mation. Thus, it is a de facto relationship that is given a legal recognition to pro-
duce some legal effects. As indicated in the preceding subsection, this is one of the 
distinguishing elements between the conclusion of a marriage and formation of an 
irregular union. Consequently, most relations that are alleged to be marriages are 
supposed to remain irregular unions in the absence of marriage celebration. As a 
matter of fact, a certain relationship between a man and a woman may be claimed a 
(re)marriage. Nevertheless, the relation may fail to satisfy the legal requirement of 
a (re)marriage. Determining the nature of the relation traces back to the beginning 
of the relation and its form of commencement. It must be borne in mind that char-
acterizing the relation either as a marriage or an irregular union entails different 
legal consequences in some cases.
35
 As a result, the law draws a clear line of dis-
tinction between a marriage and an irregular union upon their creation, during their 
continuance and upon their termination. Yet, the relationship created in an irregu-
lar union is analogous to that of a marriage. 
Therefore, an irregular union is formed based on the commencement of a rela-
tion that is analogous to a marriage without any specific form. Traditionally, most 
irregular unions used to develop out of sexual relations accompanied by cohabita-
tion over a period of time.
36
  
                                                                                                                                                   
blood would amount to a crime of indecent sexual act under the criminal Code. See Criminal Code, 
supra note30, Art.655. The existence of a marriage may also be considered an impediment against 
irregular union as it undermines the duty of fidelity the breach of which amounts to a crime of adul-
tery. Yet, bigamy cannot be an impediment for an irregular union under the Revised Family Code and 
the Criminal Code. However, it is provided as an impediment by the regional family code of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples regional state. See The Southern Nation, Nationalities 
and Peoples Regional State’s Family Code Proc. No. 75/2004, DEBUB NEGARIT GAZETTA, 9th Year, 
Extraordinary Issue No. 1,  Art.108[hereinafter, SNNPs Family Code], Art.21. Even then, it cannot 
be considered bigamy in the strict sense of the term.  Hence, the relevant provisions providing for 
essential conditions of a valid marriage are mutatis mutandis applicable for an irregular union. 
34 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 98.  A formal conclusion that is signified by celebration is not 
required for an irregular union. This can be gathered from the reading of the phrase “…without hav-
ing concluded a valid marriage” as enshrined in Art.98 of the Code. See also The Explanatory Note 
on the Revised Family Code, at 143. 
35  For example, pecuniary effects in particular legal presumption of common property begins to 
operate soon after the conclusion in a marriage (Art.28(3)) while the presumption becomes operation 
only after three years in an irregular union(Art.102(1)). Similarly, marriage is preferred to an irregu-
lar union for resolution of the conflict of paternity in the absence of an agreement between the pre-
sumed fathers as per Art. 148(a) of the Revised Family Code.  Moreover, considering the relation as a 
marriage may also involve the issue of bigamy if a subsequent marriage is concluded prior to dissolu-
tion of the preceding marriage. In contrast, this is not an issue at all in an irregular union. 
36 See Tilahun Teshome, ከጋብቻ ዉጭ በግብረ ሥጋ አብሮ መኖር፤ ችግሮችና የመፍትኤ ሀሳቦች‹ 
የቤተሰብ ህግን ከኤፌዲሪ ህገ-መንግስት ጋር ለማጣጣም ለሚደረገዉ ዓዉደ ጥናት የቀረበ የመወያያ 
ጽሑፍ፣ከሰኔ 21-25፣1991 ዓ.ም (Irregular Union: Problems and Recommendations, A Discussion 
Paper presented on a workshop for the conformity between the Family Law and the FDRE Constitu-
tion, June 28-July 2, 1998), at 3-10. 
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C. Proof of  Marriage and Irregular Union by Possession of Status 
Proof of a marriage is as important as its conclusion for the purpose of deter-
mining its legal effects. Proof of its celebration in one of the forms is thus a pre-
requisite for claiming the legal effects produced by the marriage.
37
 Such is not the 
case for an irregular union. For an irregular union, no specific form is needed for 
its commencement. Rather, its existence as of a certain time and the legal effects 
created thereof are so important. Yet, both marriage and irregular union require a 
proof. The issue of proof may arise either during or after the termination of the re-
lations. In most cases, the issue of a proof arises upon dissolution of a marriage or 
upon termination of an irregular union. The issue is often triggered by a claim of 
pecuniary effects. 
 Proof of a marriage can be made primarily by marriage certificate.
38
 This is 
the rule in proof of a marriage. The production of a valid marriage certificate is a 
conclusive proof of the conclusion of the alleged marriage. The marriage certifi-
cate would normally indicate, inter alia, the date and mode of celebration of the 
marriage.
39
 Thus, adducing the certificate before the court would resolve the issue 
of the conclusion of a marriage on a certain date in one of the modes of celebra-
tion. In practice, the experience of obtaining a marriage certificate appears to be 
uncommon in Ethiopia. This might be attributed to lack of well-functioning institu-
tions in the rural parts of the country. The community’s lack of awareness about 
the need for and significance of marriage registration can be another major reason.  
As a result, the most dominant mode of proof is that of possession of marital 
status. It must be noted that a proof by possession of marital status is a default ave-
nue that operates as an exception to the primary mode. Thus, a resort to such an 
exception must be justified under Article 95 of Revised Family Code. When so 
justified, proof of the conclusion of a marriage would be made by possession of 
status.
40
 In a proof by possession of marital status, the conclusion of a marriage is 
presumed upon proof of the elements indicated by the law.
41
 The constitutive ele-
ments that must be proved are: cohabitation, the mutual treatment of the spouses as 
husband and wife, their treatment as such by their family and community. Unfor-
tunately, the list of the constitutive elements does not explicitly include celebration 
of the marriage in a specific form.
42
  
                                                          
37 As per Art. 28(3) of the Revised Family Code, it is stipulated that any marriage shall have ef-
fect from the date of its conclusion. 
38 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 94. 
39 Id.  Art. 30(c). 
40 Id.  Arts. 95-97. 
41 Id.  Art. 97(1). 
42 The definition of possession of marital status regrettably excludes the element from its ambit. 
See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 96. 
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In this regard, the Family Code of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples Regional State (SNNPRs) clearly stipulates the requirement of proving the 
conclusion of a marriage in one of the modes of celebration.
43
 Under the regional 
family code, proof of a marriage by possession of status requires proving celebra-
tion of a marriage as opposed to that of an irregular union. Consequently, presump-
tion of conclusion of a marriage would be drawn only when, inter alia, its celebra-
tion in a certain form is proved.
44
  This element plays a key role in signifying the 
conclusion or otherwise of an alleged marriage.  
 In fact, all the constitutive elements of possession of marital status under the 
Revised Family Code require sufficient proof. Thus, upon proof of the elements, 
proof of the celebration of the alleged marriage is quite decisive even though it is 
not expressly required by the Revised Family Code. Proving celebration is of a 
paramount significance as it marks the conclusion of the marriage.  This element 
can be read into the definition of possession of marital status. In so doing, the 
proof by possession of status can be complete and reliable.  Based on proof of the 
status, the court may then infer the presumption of conclusion of the marriage.
45
 In 
principle, the proof of the elements of possession of status can be made by any re-
liable evidence.
46
 Nonetheless, under the Civil Code of Ethiopia, proof of posses-
sion of status was limited to testimonial evidence.
47
 No such restriction is indicated 
in the Revised Family Code. In practice, it appears that proof by possession of 
marital status primarily depends on the oral testimony of witnesses.
48
 The testimo-
nial evidence must be relevant to establish the constitutive elements of possession 
of marital status.  
For instance, under the SNNPs Family Code, the conclusion of a marriage in a 
certain form must be testified by the witnesses that witnessed the celebration of the 
                                                          
43  See SNNPs Family Code, supra note 33, Art. 108. 
44 Id. In UK, for instance, the absence of evidence of celebration of the marriage would bar draw-
ing the presumption of its conclusion. See also NIGEL LOWE & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, BROMLEY’S FAMILY 
LAW, 65 (10th ed. 2007).  
45 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 97(1). The reading of the provision appears to render the pre-
sumption optional. But, as long as sufficient evidence is adduced to prove possession of status, the 
court is left with no alternative, but to draw the presumption. Hence, despite the deceptive wording of 
the provision, in effect, the presumption is rather mandatory. 
46 For instance, the registration of the spouse in public document at kebele administration and bi-
ography form at public office can be considered as reliable evidence. See Social Security Agency v. 
Woletebirhan Kassaye, supra note 25. 
47 See CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, Art. 700. 
48 Despite the fact that the law does not specify the kind of evidence, the elements of possession 
of status are factual situations that are best proved by testimonial evidence. Moreover, the number of 
witnesses required is not fixed by the law. It appears that the credibility and sufficiency of the testi-
monial evidence would not necessarily depend on the number of the witnesses, but on the content of 
the evidence. In the Civil Code, proof and contestation of possession of status are made by the testi-
mony of four witnesses. See CIVIL CODE, supra note 3, Art. 700. In contrast, proof of an irregular un-
ion by possession of status was based on any kind of reliable evidence. Id.  Art. 719. 
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marriage.
49
 The practical significance of this requirement might be limited due to 
the possible absence of witnesses with personal observation. It is not clear whether 
or not courts dealing with the issue under the Revised Family Code would attach a 
weight to the testimony of a witness that is based on indirect knowledge. As can be 
noted from some cases that involved celebration as an element in the proof, due 
weight has been given to the testimony of witnesses present at the celebration.
50
  
In general, the proof of possession of status triggers a judicial presumption of 
the conclusion of the marriage. The presumption, once established by the plaintiff, 
would shift the burden of proof to the other party.
51
 Indeed, the presumption would 
have a profound legal consequence.
52
 The presumption so inferred can be rebutted 
by any reliable evidence.
53
 Thus, the rebuttal evidence is also not limited to a spe-
cific type of evidence. The most appropriate kind of the evidence would rather be 
dictated by the fact in issue. 
Compared to marriage, proof of an irregular union is made only by proving 
the existence of possession of status. As there is no registration for an irregular un-
ion, there does not exist a certificate or written record for proving the union. Pos-
session of status as defined by the law
54
 is used to establish the formation or exist-
ence of an irregular union. For an irregular union, the elements that require a proof 
are: the cohabitation of the cohabitants, their behavior that is analogous to a mar-
ried couple, their treatment as a married couple by their family as well as their 
treatment as such by the community.
55
 Following the proof of the cumulative ele-
ments, a rebuttable presumption of the existence of an irregular union will be 
drawn by the court.
56
 The presumption is created only upon proof of the elements 
by the required evidence. Nonetheless, the kind of evidence required for proof is 
not specified under the Revised Family Code. Thus, like the case of a marriage, 
proof of an irregular union through possession of status can be made by adducing 
any reliable evidence. In most cases, the existence of the possession of status is 
primarily established based on the oral testimony of the witnesses. Furthermore, it 
is also not uncommon to find the production of social, financial and employment 
                                                          
49 SNNPS FAMILY CODE, supra note 33, Art. 129(2). 
50 See Yeshareg Abatkun v.Mesert Admasu, supra note 22. See also Asres Mesfin v. Wubnesh 
Takele, infra note 59, at 177(in which regional court emphasized on the need for proof of celebration 
by witnesses); Alehegn Mekonnen v. Aster Arahaya, FEDERAL SUPREME COURT CASS. FILE 
No.52569/2010, 11 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS. 47, 47-49 (2011).  
51  Shifting the burden of proof to the other party is one of the basic legal effects of a presump-
tion. See JOHN W. STRONG (ED.), MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 520-529(5th ed. 1999). 
52 See Andrew Borkowski, The Presumption of Marriage, 14 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 251, 251 
(2002). 
53 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art.  97(2). 
54 Id.  Art. 106(2). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. Art. 106(3) & (4). 
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records designating the partner as a spouse.
57
 In fact, these documents can be con-
sidered as corroborative evidence to supplement the testimonial evidence.  Thus, 
the elements that need to be proved for an irregular union are substantially analo-
gous to that of possession of status for marriage.
58
   
Therefore, due to the substantial similarity in the elements, the modes of proof 
are likely to create confusion between marriage and an irregular union. Particular-
ly, this is the case as proving celebration of a marriage in a certain form is not stip-
ulated in the definition of possession of marital status. Furthermore, the ambivalent 
stance of the Federal Supreme Court on the point is another source of confusion.
59
 
As a result, there might be instances where an irregular union is mistaken for a 
marriage and vice versa. In this regard, adopting the experience of the SNNPs 
Family Code is commendable to avoid the ambiguity.  
D. The Non-Liquidation of Pecuniary Effects of a Marriage after Divorce 
A marriage once concluded gives rise to the creation of personal and pecuni-
ary relations. The pecuniary relations such as acquisition and administration of 
personal and common properties constitute pecuniary effects of a marriage. Thus, 
pecuniary effects are important legal effects of a marriage.
60
 The pecuniary effects 
created upon conclusion of the marriage come to an end upon its dissolution.
61
 As 
one of the grounds of dissolution of a marriage,
62
 divorce leads to the liquidation of 
the pecuniary effects. The pecuniary interests once engendered would then be sub-
ject to liquidation process.  
In principle, the liquidation is intended to be made by the agreement of the 
spouses.
63
 In default of the agreement, it shall be governed by the operation of the 
law.
64
 In the process of liquidation, the spouses would be allowed, subject to a 
proof, to reclaim their respective personal property and share the common proper-
                                                          
57 Documents such as Idir, insurance, joint bank account, employment record, etc may be pro-
duced to corroborate other evidence.  See also Alehegn Mekonnen v. Aster Arahaya, .supra note 50.  
In the case, proof of irregular union was invoked in an alternative claim in the event proof of mar-
riage might fail. 
58 In both cases, the possession of status is defined to consist of mutual treatment of the spous-
es/cohabitants as married couple, their treatment as such by their family and the community, and co-
habitation. See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Arts. 96 and 106(2).  
59 In one case, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division criticized the decision of decision 
of Amhara regional courts that considered “proof of celebration” as a distinguishing element between 
proof of marriage and that of an irregular union. See Asres Mesfin v. Wubnesh Takele, Federal Su-
preme Court, Cass. File No. 21740/2007, 5 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS 174, 174-179(2009).  In anoth-
er case, the same division of the court indicated the need for proof of celebration of a customary mar-
riage in a proof of marriage. See Yeshareg Abatkun v. Mesert Admasu, supra note 22, at 266. 
60 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Arts. 57-73. 
61 Id.  Art. 85. 
62 Id. Art. 75(c). 
63 Id.  Art. 85(1).  
64 Id.  Art. 85(2). 
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ty.
65
 The court pronouncing the divorce is expected to render its decision on the 
liquidation of marital property soon after the divorce.
66
 In a divorce by petition, the 
court may not postpone the decision for more than six months after the divorce.
67
 
However, the issue that begs question is the duration within which spouses can 
claim the liquidation. The Revised Family Code is mute on this issue. The Federal 
Supreme Court has taken note of the silence and decided the issue based on the pe-
riod of limitation under the law of obligations.
68
 Thus, it is possible that the liqui-
dation of pecuniary effects may be made any time within ten years since the disso-
lution of the marriage. This is quite common for cases of dissolution of a marriage 
by death. In case of divorce, though such a delay is not common, the spouses may 
still fail to follow up the liquidation process after divorce. In such a case, the pecu-
niary effects may remain non-liquidated.  
Nonetheless, the non-liquidation of the marital property does not indicate the 
continuity of the marriage. Nor does it necessarily imply the existence of a remar-
riage that arises from the conclusion of a new marriage. Once a divorce is pro-
nounced, the legal presumption of common property will cease to operate as the 
marital bond is unequivocally terminated by the divorce decision. That is, the op-
eration of the presumption is limited to during the continuance of the marriage. 
Though the existing common property would remain as such until its partition, all 
future pecuniary interests of the spouses would be subject to the ordinary rules of 
property law.
69
 Thus, the non-liquidation of the pecuniary effects does not neces-
sarily presuppose the continued existence of the previous marriage or a remarriage.  
II. SUMMARY  OF FACTS OF THE CASE 
The case originally arose before the Federal First Instance Court (FFIC) be-
tween W/ro Abebework Getaneh (hereinafter, the petitioner) and W/ro Wagaye 
Haile (hereinafter, the respondent).
70
 In the case, the petitioner claimed the exist-
ence of a marriage between herself and her deceased ex-husband named Ato 
                                                          
65 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Arts. 85-93.  See generally Sileshi Bedasie, Determination of 
Personal and Common Property During Dissolution of Marriage under Ethiopian Law: An Overview 
of the Law and Practice, 2 OROMIA L. J. 138, 138-186 (2012). 
66 This is usually the case for conditions of divorce by mutual consent. The agreement on condi-
tions of divorce shall be approved along with the divorce agreement. See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, 
Art. 80(2). 
67 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 83(4). 
68 See Dinke Tedla v Abate Chane, Federal Supreme Court, Cass. File No.17937/2007, 4 FED. 
SUP. CT. CASS. DECS 82, 82-85(2009). 
69 Any property acquired after the date of divorce would become private property as per the rele-
vant legal provisions of property law. The property may be subject to individual or co-ownership 
based on whether it is acquired personally by a spouse or jointly by both spouses. No legal presump-
tion of common property would operate to govern the property jointly acquired after divorce. 
70Abebawork G. v. Wagaye H, FEDERAL SUPREME COURT, CASS. FILE NO. 23021/99(E.C) [herein-
after, cited as “Abebawork v Wagaye Case ”]. 
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Amare Yilma. As can be gathered from the record of cassation decision, the mar-
riage between the petitioner and the deceased was dissolved by divorce in 1976 
(E.C). The marriage lasted only for a decade. The divorce judgment made by the 
then family arbitrators was approved by the court. Four months after the divorce, 
the ex-spouses were reconciled to live together without concluding a marriage. 
Following the death of her ex-husband, the petitioner filed an application before 
FFIC for declaration of existence of marriage in until 1995. The court ruled that 
there was a marriage between the petitioner and Ato Amare. The respondent as a 
guardian for the son of the deceased filed an objection before the FFIC against the 
declaratory judgment. Following the objection, a ruling was made in favor of the 
respondent quashing the declaratory judgment. In effect, the ruling set aside the 
previous decision of existence of marriage by the court.  Eventually, the case was 
let run its course all the way up to the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
Court. 
III. RULINGS AND REASONING OF THE COURTS 
This section is devoted to a brief summary of the salient statements of the 
case pertaining to the ruling and the reasoning of the courts throughout the pro-
ceedings. The critique on the ruling and the reasoning of each court would be made 
in the section to follow. 
A. Ruling and Reasoning of the Federal First Instance Court 
In the case at hand, the court was seized with the issue of whether there was a 
marriage or not. So, the issue was essentially about proof of the marriage.  Never-
theless, since there was no marriage record, the proof was based on possession of 
status. Having heard the arguments and witnesses of both parties on possession of 
status, the court ruled that the existence of the alleged marriage was not sufficient-
ly proved.
71
 In its reasoning, it indicated that the presumed conclusion of the mar-
riage was satisfactorily rebutted by the respondent. The rebuttal evidence that was 
given more weight was a letter from the kebele administration based on the testi-
mony of three witnesses. The letter was the only written evidence submitted to re-
but the presumption of conclusion of the alleged marriage. The letter purported to 
be an official declaration of the inexistence of cohabitation between the appli-
cant/petitioner and the deceased after the dissolution of the initial marriage.
72
 The 
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B. Ruling and Reasoning of the Federal High Court 
In dealing with the appeal, the Federal High Court (FHC) noted the continued 
cohabitation between the petitioner and the deceased ex-husband soon after four 
months following the dissolution of the marriage by divorce.
74
 It was proved in the 
lower court that they were reconciled to continue living together despite the di-
vorce.
75
 Undisputed was also the non-liquidation of pecuniary relations after the 
divorce.
76
 Having noted these facts, the issue framed by the FHC was whether the 
spouses had to remarry or be reinstated via reconciliation to renew their former 
marriage.
77
 The FHC indicated that the law is mute to address the issue.
78
 Nonethe-
less, the Court ruled that the previous marriage continued to exist as remarriage 
would not be required to renew the marital union.
79
  In effect, the appellate court 
reversed the decision of the lower court. In substantiating its ruling, the Court stat-
ed that it is uncommon in our custom for ex-spouses to conclude a new marriage 
between themselves after a divorce.
80
 Rather, the reconciliation itself was indica-
tive of their intention to live together as husband and wife.
81
 Likewise, their recon-
ciliation after divorce would be deemed to have the effect of cohabitation in a mar-
riage.
82
 Moreover, the non-liquidation of the pecuniary relations would evidence 
the continuity of the marriage even after the divorce.
83
 
C. Ruling and Reasoning of the Federal Supreme Court 
In response to the appeal lodged by the respondent, the appellate division of 
the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) reversed the decision of the FHC. In other 
words, the court ruled out the existence of a marriage between the petitioner and 
the deceased ex-husband after the divorce. In its reasoning, the court rejected the 
issues of reconciliation and continued cohabitation that underpinned the ruling of 
the FHC.
84
 The FSC made its stand clear that none of the grounds would constitute 
or evidence conclusion of a remarriage.
85
 The court also mentioned that the con-
clusion of a new marriage or proof of the same was not the contention of the peti-
tioner.
86
 Hence, neither reconciliation nor cohabitation would be regarded as an ev-
                                                          
74 Id. at para 6. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  at para 4 & 6. 
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D. Ruling and Reasoning of the Cassation Division 
Following the petition of the current petitioner, the Cassation Division of the 
FSC was seized with the matter to give its binding interpretation of the law on the 
issue. In the beginning, the parties were summoned to clarify whether the marriage 
was in fact dissolved through divorce or the death of the ex-husband.
88
 The disso-
lution of the marriage by divorce long before the death of the ex-husband was not 
disputed. As a result, the Cassation Division went further to verify whether or not 
the alleged marital union was created between the petitioner and the deceased after 
the divorce in 1976 E.C.
89
 In addressing the issue, the court highlighted the silence 
of the law on the necessity of remarriage between ex-spouses following their rec-
onciliation.
90
 In so doing, it however admitted the existence of possible argument 
against the need for a specific legal stipulation for a remarriage.
91
 This is so as a 
remarriage in effect would not be different from conclusion of a new marriage.
92
 
Yet, the Cassation Division ruled that the existence of the marriage could be estab-
lished based on possession of status under Art. 96 of the Revised Family Code. In 
this regard, the court stated that the cohabitation of the ex-spouses as husband and 
wife after reconciliation and their treatment as such by the community would evi-
dence the possession of status.
93
 The Cassation Division also mentioned that the 
legal presumption so created under Art. 97(1) of the Revised Family Code
94
 was 




This section endeavors to make a critical analysis of the decisions and reason-
ing of the courts that have been summarized in the preceding section. To this ef-
fect, the analysis would be made in the light of the legal framework highlighted in 
the beginning section. 
                                                          
87 Id. 
88 Id.  at para 8. 
89Id.  at para 9.  
90 Id.  at para 12. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. In the course of its reasoning, the FSC explicitly stated that remarriage after divorce is not 
different from conclusion of a new marriage. It further indicated that regulating it anew may likely 
raise an argument about the necessity of a legislative act to do so. This is due to the fact that conclu-
sion of a new marriage, irrespective of the parties, is subject to the existing legal rules under THE 
REVISED FAMILY CODE. 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id.  at para 13. 
95 Id.  at para 14. 
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A. The Decision of the Federal First Instance Court 
In this sub-section, three important legal issues will be analyzed in light of the 
Revised Family Code. The first legal issue would be about the establishment of 
presumption of conclusion of the alleged marriage. This would be followed by a 
critical analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence for the presumption. The last 
pertinent legal issue would be the effect of post-divorce cohabitation. 
1. Presumption of Conclusion of a Remarriage 
As can be noted from the facts of the case and the ruling of the FFIC, the ju-
dicial declaration of the petitioner’s marital status was disputed by the respondent 
in the same court. The court subsequently reversed its previous decision stating 
that the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient to establish possession of sta-
tus. This begs the question as to what extent the first decision was well-founded on 
sufficient evidence. It is a rule of procedure that judicial presumption of conclusion 
of a (re)marriage shall follow an established proof of possession of status. In other 
words, whosoever alleges the conclusion of a marriage and seeks to prove same on 
the basis of possession of status is required to establish the constitutive elements of 
the status as defined under Art 96 of the Revised Family Code. As stated in the 
Code, the elements namely: mutual treatment as spouses, cohabitation, and treat-
ment as spouses by the community and their family are all cumulative conditions 
that require sufficient proof. It is unfortunate that celebration of a marriage is miss-
ing from the elements.
96
 Indeed, all the other elements emanate from the conclu-
sion of a (re)marriage in one of the forms prescribed by the law.  
Without celebration of the (re)marriage in accordance with a given form that 
marks the conclusion of a (re)marriage, the elements in themselves would remain 
hollow and rootless. In the case at hand, no celebration was proved to trigger the 
presumption of conclusion of the remarriage.
97
 The court did not consider the issue 
of celebration at all. The judicial oversight of the issue might be attributed to the 
silence in the law.  Unlike the SNNPs Family Code,
98
 the Revised Family Code re-
grettably omits celebration of a (re)marriage from its definition of possession of 
status. The former requires proof of celebration as an integral component of pos-
session of status to establish the judicial presumption of conclusion of a marriage. 
The omission of such a decisive element in the Revised Family Code has already 
created a confusion thereby blurring the basic distinction between a marriage and 
an irregular union. For the presumption of conclusion of the remarriage to be taken 
by the court, proof of its celebration should be considered as an inherent element 
                                                          
96 There is no explicit mention of “celebration” in the definition of possession of status. See THE 
REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 96. 
97 Proof of celebration of the alleged post-divorce remarriage was not even raised as an issue.  
98 SNNPs FAMILY CODE, supra note 43. 
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of proof of possession of status. Without proof of such a decisive element, pre-
sumption of conclusion of the alleged remarriage would remain unwarranted. It is 
assumed that FFIC was not unaware of significance of a mode of celebration as an 
essential point of distinction between a (re)marriage and an irregular union. More-
over, the court was quite aware of the absence of a celebration for the post-divorce 
cohabitation. Nevertheless, the court took the presumption of conclusion of the 
marriage and ordered for its rebuttal. Hence, the court’s presumption of conclusion 
of the alleged remarriage lacked a firm legal basis.  
2. Sufficiency of Evidence for the Presumption 
In the case at hand, it appears that even the elements that were stated by the 
law were not well-established. Indeed, the degree of proof required to create the 
presumption of conclusion of a marriage is not clear. Yet, the degree of preponder-
ance common in other civil suits would seem to suffice as long as it is properly 
weighed.
99
 The question worth asking is how sufficient was the evidence to estab-
lish the presumption of the alleged remarriage. This question is important as the 
issue of celebration and the relevant evidence thereto were altogether neglected. In 
effect, the decisive part of the evidence was missing.
100
 Ignorance of the evidence 
would render the whole evidence below the threshold required for the presumption. 
It may be argued that the court’s revocation of its previous decision might allude to 
its reluctance to adhere to the standard of proof required to create the presumption. 
Apparently, the presumption drawn was not well-founded to withstand a little re-
fute. This can be inferred from the court’s assessment of the rebuttal evidence. The 
letter was found to be quite sufficient to rebut the presumption.
101
  
Further, it was held that the testimonial evidence adduced to set up the pre-
sumption was insufficient to prove the possession of status. However, the court 
went further to consider the rebuttal evidence. In so doing, it found the evidence 
sufficient to rebut the presumption of remarriage that led to its previous decision. If 
at all, the oral evidence was insufficient to prove the possession of status, one may 
wonder how the court took the presumption to deal with the rebuttal.
102
 The reason 
                                                          
99 As long as a specific exception calling for a higher degree of proof is not stipulated by the law, 
the established rule of degree of proof (i.e, degree of preponderance/balance of probability) in civil 
suits would be the governing standard. See BETATEK TADESSE, BASIC CONCEPTS OF EVIDENCE LAW, 
280-281 (1st ed.  2005). 
100 Each of the elements of possession of status would be proved by sufficient evidence to estab-
lish the presumption of conclusion of the alleged marriage. From among the facts to be proven, cele-
bration of marriage, though not counted as such in the law, is the critical element seeking sufficient 
proof to warrant the inference of the presumption.  
101Abebawork v Wagaye Case , supra note 70,  at para 5.  
102 The reasoning of the court itself is self-contradictory on this point. On one hand, the court ar-
gued that the testimonial evidence submitted by the petitioner was insufficient to prove possession of 
status. On the other hand, the court took the presumption of the conclusion of the remarriage and or-
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is that rebuttal presupposes the establishment of the presumption, which in turn 
depends on proof of possession of status.
103
 Such a venture would cast a doubt on 
the credibility of the successive and contradictory rulings. In the absence of a pre-
sumption, it would amount to a procedural irregularity to deal with rebuttal evi-
dence. This procedural flaw would be severe enough to affect the ruling. Where 
presumption is involved, the court cannot routinely call for production of evidence 
from both parties turn-by-turn. The evidence of the other party is required only af-
ter the presumption is set in operation.
104
 If the presumption is not well-
established, the case will be closed. Were the court to find the evidence insuffi-
cient, it could avoid taking the presumption. That would also entail setting aside its 
prior ruling. 
In the event the evidence adduced is found sufficient to create the presump-
tion, the rebuttal of the presumption can be duly ordered by the court. Despite the 
silence of the Revised Family Code on the kind of relevant evidence for proof of 
possession of status, it is indicated that rebuttal can be made based on any kind of 
reliable evidence.
105
 Thus, either oral or written evidence or even both kinds as ap-
propriate can be used in rebuttal. In contrast, the appropriate evidence for proof of 
the constitutive elements of the possession of status would primarily be oral evi-
dence.
106
 With regard to the rebuttal evidence, even though the presumption itself 
was not convincingly established, the court considered a letter from the kebele ad-
ministration to the CBE as sufficient evidence. It is arguable if such a written dec-
laration of non-cohabitation is worth the credence. Be that as it may, the decision 
was flawed as the issues of the presumption and the cohabitation were miscon-
strued.  
                                                                                                                                                   
dered for rebuttal evidence. Rebuttal evidence is required only when the proof is sufficient to create 
the presumption.  
103 The law unambiguously states that the court may presume the conclusion of the alleged mar-
riage when the possession of status under Art.96 of the Revised Family Code is proved. Proving pos-
session of status is a condition precedent for the operation of the presumption and the subsequent re-
buttal. See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art.97.  
104 It is a rule that evidence is introduced by the other party only after the first party has made his 
case out by producing sufficient evidence, which, in his opinion, would justify the finding in his fa-
vor. In particular, this is more so where a rebuttable presumption governs the issue as the other party 
is required to produce evidence (usually rebuttal evidence) after the presumption is triggered by the 
first party. Yet, the first party bears the burden of setting up the presumption by proving the existence 
of the facts that lead to the presumption. See ROBERT A. SEDLER, ETHIOPIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
200(1968). 
105T HE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 97(2). Under the Civil Code, proof by possession of status 
and its contestation were exclusively based on the testimony of four witnesses.  See CIVIL CODE, su-
pra note 3, Art. 700 
106 The nature of factual elements would normally require oral evidence to establish their exist-
ence. Nevertheless, relevant written evidence such as registration of the spouses in public 
/community documents, family and private documents or letters of the spouses may still be used to 
corroborate the oral evidence. 
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3. Cohabitation Not a Proof of Remarriage 
In the case, the prime issue before the court was about the post-divorce cohab-
itation. The ruling on the issue stood in a stark contradiction with the legal regime. 
Sticking to the factual relation, the court was misguided by the issue of cohabita-
tion. Instead, the proper issue at hand would have been all about the (non-) conclu-
sion of a remarriage in one of the forms after the divorce. This had to be the case 
as a continued cohabitation after a divorce per se would not suffice to constitute a 
remarriage between the ex-spouses.
107
 Nowhere in the law does proof of non-
marital cohabitation imply a remarriage. Once the former marriage was dissolved 
by a divorce, that previous bond would come to an end.
108
 No marital bond would 
then persist after its dissolution as its existence was formally terminated. Even, the 
court’s decision on divorce as such is not subject to further judicial review by ap-
peal.
109
 It is worth noting that a marital bond once terminated by divorce can never 
be repaired through cohabitation.  
Strictly speaking, the cohabitation of the spouses would not have the effect of 
setting aside the divorce decision of the court that stood good for all legal purpos-
es. Nonetheless, the ex-spouses could create a new marital union. In fact, they 
were at liberty to do so any time without a limitation. Hence, the existence of a 
post-divorce marital union between the ex-spouses depends on a remarriage. Re-
marriage is understood to mean a second marriage after the dissolution of a previ-
ous marriage. The remarriage can be concluded between ex-spouses or one of the 
ex-spouses and another person. Remarriage necessarily occurs through celebration 




In the case under consideration, the issue would be whether or not there exist-
ed a remarriage. As can be noted from the record, no remarriage was proved. In the 
absence of such a remarriage, there would be no legal basis for proof of a remar-
riage. Cohabitation would never suffice to warrant presumption of conclusion of a 
remarriage. Since celebration is a prerequisite for conclusion of a (re)marriage, 
                                                          
107 A post-divorce cohabitation along with other elements of possession of status can be regarded 
as an irregular union. For irregular union, no formal instance of commencement such as celebration is 
required. 
108 Divorce is one of the grounds for the complete dissolution of a valid marriage. A marriage so 
dissolved would cease to exist in the eyes of the law. See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 75(c). In 
the same token, a marriage dissolved due to declaration of absence may not be restored upon the re-
appearance of the absentee. See Wubit Hiruy v. Hawassa City Finance and Economic Development 
Office, Federal Supreme Court Cass. File No.74791/2013, 14 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS 167, 167-
170(2013). 
109 No appeal can be lodged against the judgment of the court on divorce as such. See THE 
REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 112.  
110  Conclusion of a (re)marriage necessarily depends upon its celebration in one of the forms 
prescribed by the law. Indeed, that is the very reason for regulating the modes of celebration. 
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proof of cohabitation along the other elements, yet short of celebration, would not 
be sufficient to constitute proof of the alleged remarriage. Even though the ulti-
mate decision of the lower court was not flawed as such, the procedure, the issue 
and the reasoning of the court were all tainted with errors and misconstructions.  
B. The Decision of the Federal High Court 
Treated in this sub-section is the critical analysis of reconciliation and the gap 
between the law and the practice. Besides, the effect of non-liquidation after di-
vorce is worth analyzing. At first blush, dwelling on the issues may appear redun-
dant. Yet, a closer scrutiny of each issue merits meticulous analysis.  
1. Reconciliation Not A Substitute for Remarriage 
The ruling of the FHC as reflected in its reasoning was based on three 
grounds that call for critical analysis. The first ground relied on by the court was 
the reconciliation of the ex-spouses after the divorce. In so doing, the court gave 
undue weight to the subsequent reconciliation that was proved in the lower court. 
In grappling with the effect of the reconciliation, the court mentioned the silence of 
the law with regard to renewing the former marital relationship. Indeed, the prima-
ry issue was whether reconciliation alone would restore the marital bond that was 
once terminated by the divorce. Reconciliation under the Revised Family Code is 
an important step in saving the dissolution of a marriage by divorce. To this end, 
attempts would be made both by the court and arbitrators chosen by the spouses to 
reconcile the latter during divorce proceedings. A successful judicial/court-
supervised reconciliation could rescue a marriage from divorce.  
A post-divorce reconciliation does, however, bear no such effect for the mari-
tal bond was dissolved for good by the divorce. Should the ex-spouses desire to 
have similar marital union upon reconciliation, they should first establish a new 
one in accordance with the law. Reconciliation can never be equivalent to conclu-
sion of a remarriage which signifies the creation of a marital bond. Legally speak-
ing, post-divorce reconciliation cannot amount to a remarriage despite the exist-
ence of such a practice where the spouses assume to be in a marital union.
111
 For a 
marital union to exist between the ex-spouses, there must be a remarriage which 
should flow from the celebration of a second marriage. At best, post-divorce rec-
                                                          
111 If such a practice needs to be recognized as a special procedure for ex-spouses to conclude a 
subsequent remarriage after the dissolution of a previous marriage, that should be revisited by the 
legislative organ. Of course, it can be argued that the law has already provided for the possible ave-
nues to create a new marriage in one of the three forms. As a result, considering reconciliation as a 
conclusion of a remarriage is simply unnecessary if at all the law is to be implemented consistently. 
The law in providing for the modes of celebration is assumed to have taken into account all the pre-
vailing situations/practices in the society. In the alternative, the law still gives recognition to the co-
habitation upon reconciliation after divorce as an irregular union. This can accommodate the practice.  
Hence, the law as such must be enforced unless changed by the appropriate organ. 
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onciliation would only suggest mutual consent for cohabitation. The cohabitation 
together with other elements might develop into an irregular union. Thus, the effect 
of post-divorce reconciliation falls short of a remarriage.  
2. Remarriage at Odds with the Practice 
In this regard, the court’s second issue was whether or not conclusion of a 
new marriage is required to renew the marriage. In addressing the issue, the court 
relied on the practical experience of the society as the second ground to justify its 
ruling. Consequently, the fact that conclusion of a new marriage is uncommon in 
practice was considered as another ground for its decision. It is true that conclusion 
of a new marriage by ex-spouses seems to be uncommon in Ethiopia.
112
 This may 
be attributable to lack of awareness of the legal significance of a formal conclusion 
of a (re)marriage. Moreover, some spouses tend to believe that a previous marriage 
can be brought back to life once again through reconciliation and cohabitation. 
Hence, conclusion of a remarriage through one of the forms appears to them un-
necessary.  
In practice, the society may not expect ex-spouses to undergo celebration of a 
second marriage. Moreover, as divorce is condemned on religious ground, the 
spouses would be encouraged to reunite via reconciliation. In particular, this is 
likely to be the case with Christianity. Once divorced, the divorcees are not sup-
posed to conclude a remarriage with other persons. Yet, there is no such a barrier 
to conclude a civil marriage as the marriage is freely celebrated before the con-
cerned office in the cities such as Addis Ababa.  In practice, civil marriage is ap-
parently not common as such in the rural parts of Ethiopia as the office of civil sta-
tus is not sufficiently accessible to the rural community.
113
 As a result, ex-spouses 
outside urban areas may tend to consider reconciliation and cohabitation as restora-
tion of the dissolved marital union. 
Despite the foregoing factors, equating reconciliation to conclusion of a re-
marriage lacks a legal basis.
114
 Nor does reconciliation serve as a legal means to 
restore a legitimate marital bond that was unequivocally terminated. Likewise, 
non-marital cohabitation is not equivalent to a remarriage. Let alone reconciliation 
or cohabitation, even a judicial declaration of any kind can never create or restore a 
                                                          
112  It is even not common among other divorcees in subsequent marriages. Some people infor-
mally start living together thereby treating the cohabitation as a marital union.  
       113 See Mehari Redai, supra  note 3, at 14. 
114 It is important to note that there is no need for interpretation in the case at hand. Even when 
interpretation is necessitated, the rule of interpretation appropriate for the issue at hand would be the 
contextual or positive rule of interpretation that makes the application of the relevant provisions ef-
fective. See George Krzeczwnowicz, An Introductory Theory of Laws in the Context of the Ethiopian 
Legal System, 5(1971) [unpublished manuscript at AAU Law Library]. 
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legal marital bond once dissolved.
115
 Thus, the court’s sympathy for the defacto 
relation between the ex-spouses and its treatment akin to remarriage is a clear de-
viation from the law.
116
 The sympathy may seem to justify the practice of equating 
a post-divorce reconciliation and cohabitation with a remarriage as a formal con-
clusion of a remarriage is not common in Ethiopia. Yet, it lacks a legal basis to 
buttress the deviation. It is submitted that a gap exists between an explicit legal 
rule and the practice. Nonetheless, leaning towards the practice in disregard of the 
law is legally unwarranted. The fluid practice must be guided by the proper appli-
cation of the law. The application of a clear legal rule must not be misunderstood 
as a mere reflection of positivism devoid of a normative content. Marriage is a 
public legal act that shapes the conduct of individuals in the union. As such, its un-
equivocal legal creation is necessitated and regulated by the relevant law for public 
interest.  
Celebration of a (re)marriage does not only evidence its very inception, but 
also distinguishes it from other informal unions. As such, celebration of a 
(re)marriage is not the making of the law. It is rather a product of the societal prac-
tice recognized by the law. Setting aside the explicit legal rule would thus nullify 
its legal significance. It would even create further unintended legal problems that 
would stem from the erosion of the distinction between a formal marriage and an 
irregular union.
117
 It should be noted that a marital status does not ensue from a 
post-divorce cohabitation between ex-spouses and their treatment as ‘spouses’ by 
the community.  
Misconstruction of a post-divorce relation that remains an irregular union or a 
mere cohabitation as a (re)marriage would entail serious legal repercussions. One 
of the possible undesirable legal consequences would be related to cases of biga-
                                                          
115 With regard to marriage and its legal effects, the power of the court under the Revised Family 
Code is exclusively so extensive. For instance, only the court is competent to decide on the conclu-
sion and validity of a marriage. Nevertheless, the court’s power is limited to deciding on whether or 
not the marriage has been concluded and is valid. It does not extend to creating or restoring a marital 
union that is ended by divorce.  See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 115.  
116  The law as it stands now does not support such a deviation. For all cases of a marriage, its 
conclusion in accordance with the prescribed forms is clearly provided by the law. The legislature 
was not unaware of the practice when it stipulated the requirement of conclusion in a certain form for 
all forms of a marriage. Should the change in the situations over a period of time necessitate amend-
ment in the requirement, that task is constitutionally entrusted to that same legislature, not the court. 
Courts are duty bound to apply the law appropriately.  
117 Apart from defeating the very fundamental goals and public social objectives behind the regu-
lation and protection of marriage as indicated in the preamble of the Revised Family Code, the specif-
ic instance of the undesired legal consequence would be related to the legal effects of a valid mar-
riage. Though an irregular union is fairly treated in the RFC in terms of its legal effects, it is still not 
on equal footing with a marriage. In the extreme, when regarded as such, bigamy would entail puni-
tive measure. See also Mehari Redai, supra note 3, at 112. 
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my.
118
 The issue would be as to how the court would deal with cases where the ex-
spouses conclude another marriage. It is arguable if they would be held responsible 
for a crime of bigamy as the preceding bond of marriage was legally dissolved de-
spite the continued cohabitation between the ex-spouses upon reconciliation.
119
 For 
crime of bigamy to exist, the existence of preceding bond of valid marriage shall 
be proved.
120
 Despite this fact, the court might hold it otherwise in such a bizarre 
case. Similar legal issue would arise in relation to the pecuniary effects of the post-
divorce relation.
121
 If the relation is treated as a marriage, it means that properties 
acquired in a relation that does not last for three years would be subject to the legal 
presumption of common property.
122
 Thus, such a decision would undermine the 
very purpose of distinguishing a (re)marriage from an irregular union. In effect, a 
formal (re)marriage and an irregular union will fade into a legal and practical in-
significance.
123
 This has been the case in the US where the significance of a mar-
riage is in decline.
124
 
In the same vein, treating a short-lived post-divorce non-marital cohabitation 
as a remarriage would also complicate legal issues pertaining to the paternity of a 
child born in the cohabitation. In particular, this is the case with regard to legal 
presumption of paternity that depends on the existence of a (re)marriage or an ir-
regular union. 
Therefore, in the absence of a formal conclusion of a remarriage between the 
ex-spouses, no bond of marital union would exist between them in a post-divorce 
cohabitation. The previous divorce decision unequivocally causes the legal dissolu-
tion of the marriage.
125
 Thus, the post-divorce relation that fails to constitute a re-
marriage would remain an irregular union or a mere cohabitation, as the case may 
be.  
 
                                                          
118  As bigamy presupposes the existence of preceding bond of a valid marriage, considering a 
case of an irregular union as a marriage would involve a perplex issue of determining bigamy as an 
impediment for subsequent marriage and render it invalid. Thus, a marriage that would be valid in the 
eyes of the law would be considered bigamous where an irregular union is mistaken for a marriage. 
119 The commission of a crime of bigamy should be strictly considered in light of the existence of 
a preceding bond of valid marriage. Otherwise, factual situations that would not constitute a relation 
more than irregular union can, if mistaken for a marriage, result in severe penalties. The absence of 
remarriage after the dissolution shall govern the case. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 30. 
120 Id.  
121 See supra note 117. 
122 For a marriage, the presumption begins to operate from the date of the marriage as one of its 
legal effect.  See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 28(3). This is not the case for an irregular union. 
See id. Art. 102(1). 
123  See Walter Otto Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L. Q. 4(415), 428(1980). 
124 See generally Walter, infra note 149. 
125 See Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and Quasi Rents; Or, “I gave Him the Best Years of My 
Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 2(267), 274(1987). 
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3. Non-Liquidation of Marital Property Not a Proof of Marital Bond 
The third ground underpinning the reasoning of the court was the non-
liquidation of pecuniary effects after divorce. It is possible that liquidation of pe-
cuniary effects can be effected soon after the divorce or be delayed for a period not 
exceeding six months.
126
 This period refers to the duration to be complied with by 
the court dealing with a divorce petition. Yet, the maximum period of limitation 
for the claim of liquidation is the 10-year duration set by the Cassation Division of 
the FSC in a recent case.
127
 Hence, the liquidation of pecuniary effects can be 
made any time within a decade since dissolution of a (re)marriage. However, the 
presumption of common property ceases to exist upon the dissolution of the mar-
riage.
128
 In other words, any property acquired after the date of divorce would re-
main the personal property of the concerned spouse. This implies that all the rules 
that are operative during a marriage would come to an end upon its dissolution. 
What remains behind is just the issue of liquidation, which is limited to retaking 
and partition of the properties acquired prior to or during the marriage. Worth men-
tioning is the fact that there may be an issue of common property in an irregular 
union arising from a post-divorce cohabitation. Nonetheless, that is applicable sub-
ject to the condition of three years after the union is created. In the case under con-
sideration, the court was rather dealing with the issue of a marital union. Therefore, 
the non-liquidation of pecuniary effects does not imply the continuance of the pre-
vious marriage after divorce. Nor does it necessarily imply the existence of a re-
marriage. The overriding divorce decision irreversibly dissolves the marriage. 
In sum, the grounds relied on by the FHC were all flawed and without legal 
basis to justify the existence of a continued marriage or remarriage between the ex-
spouses. It suffices to recap that none of the grounds stated by the court would 
stand on any legal basis to justify the ruling. For a juridical consequence to flow 
from a (re)marriage, its creation upon celebration must be proved.
129
 That is, com-
pliance with one of the special forms is indispensable for the commencement of 
the remarriage. There is no dispensation of such a requirement for the mere fact 
that the parties were ex-spouses.  
 
                                                          
126 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE , Arts. 80(2) & 83(4). 
127 See Dinke Tedla v Abate Chane, supra note 45. See also, Seyoum W/Meskel v Amsale 
Muluneh, et al., Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, Cass. File No.59539/2011, 11 FED. SUP. 
CT. CASS. DECS 92, 92-93(2011). 
128 It must be borne in mind that legal presumption of common property and its operation as such 
is the legal consequence of the conclusion and continued existence of the marriage. The dissolution 
of the marriage is thus tantamount to cessation of the presumption.  
129 Marcel Planiol and George Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law, Vol. 3, Part 1, at 497(11th ed. 
1938). 
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C. The Decision of the Appellate Division of the Federal Supreme Court 
This sub-section is limited to illuminating the standpoints of the Appellate 
Division of the FSC on the most important issues. As the author concurs with the 
stance of the court, no critical comments are made. The issues are thus highlighted 
to show the absence of basic errors of a law calling for further cassation review.   
1. No Claim of Conclusion of Remarriage 
In reversing the decision of the FHC, the court held that conclusion of a re-
marriage with the deceased was not directly alleged by the petitioner. Instead, the 
contention of the petitioner was about a post-divorce cohabitation following the 
reconciliation. Indeed, both the dissolution of the marriage and absence of subse-
quent conclusion of a remarriage were admitted by the petitioner.
130
 As rightly 
pointed out by the court, there would be no issue of remarriage between the ex-
spouses as its conclusion was not even alleged. In the absence of celebration of a 
remarriage, one cannot talk about its existence and the effects that would ensue 
thereof. Suffice to mention that celebration is a prerequisite for conclusion of a re-
marriage that in turn would give rise to its legal consequence. Thus, the signifi-
cance of this core issue was overlooked by the FHC. This deliberate but serious ju-
dicial oversight led the FHC to make unnecessary venture into the issue of 
possession of status. The erroneous endeavor of the court in this regard was cor-
rectly dismissed by the appellate division of the FSC. 
2. No Issue of Proof of Marital Status 
As indicated above, the appellate division of the FSC also stated in its reason-
ing that proof of possession of marital status was not the issue at hand. According 
to its reasoning, the petitioner’s claim was limited to the existence of cohabitation 
and reconciliation between her and the deceased husband. Hence, existence of pos-
session of marital status was not alleged as such. One might argue about the exist-
ence of an implied allegation. This ought to be a basic claim to be asserted, though. 
Indeed, possession of marital status presupposes the conclusion of a (re)marriage. 
Conclusion of a remarriage after the divorce was not even claimed as indicated 
elsewhere. In the absence of conclusion of a remarriage, reconciliation and cohabi-
tation per se would not suffice to trigger proof of possession of marital status. No 
possession of marital status exists without the existence of the remarriage. The ex-




                                                          
130 Abebawork v Wagaye Case, supra note 70, at para 4. 
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3. Reconciliation and Cohabitation Not Enough 
In addition to the aforesaid issues, the court rejected the argument of the peti-
tioner that hinged upon the post-divorce reconciliation and cohabitation. The exist-
ence of the alleged reconciliation of the ex-spouses and their consequent cohabita-
tion were not dismissed by the court. However, the unwarranted conclusion of the 
FHC about the existence of the marriage was criticized. It can be noted that proof 
of the alleged grounds would not necessarily evidence the existence of a remar-
riage. Nor does it extend the dissolved marital union beyond the date of divorce.
131
 
Consequently, the court appropriately held that reconciliation and cohabitation 
were not tantamount to a remarriage. They can be indicative of a relation amount-
ing to an irregular union. Nevertheless, they are not sufficient enough to evidence 
conclusion of a remarriage after the divorce. 
D. The Decision of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court 
In the previous sections, concise analysis of various key legal issues involved 
in the case has been made. It is believed that the analysis would indicate errors, 
clarify ambiguities and elucidate the legal issues pertaining to the rulings and rea-
soning of the courts. It is quite obvious that none of the legal interpretation(s) un-
derpinning the rulings would be binding. In contrast, the legal interpretation of the 
Cassation Division of the FSC on the case at hand would carry a prospective bind-
ing effect on all judicial and quasi-judicial organs as well as parties. This would 
remain so unless the interpretation gets changed in future cases. Thus, this sub-
section gives more emphasis to the analysis of the key legal issues involved in the 
decision.  
1. Deviation from the Issue Framed 
Initially, the Cassation Division rightly framed a proper legal issue for its in-
terpretation. The issue was whether or not a remarriage was made between the ex-
spouses. In its analysis, the Division noted the indisputability of the dissolution of 
the previous marriage after a decade. It further pointed out the proof of post-
divorce reconciliation and subsequent cohabitation few months later after the di-
vorce. Though the issue was all about the existence or non-existence of a post-
divorce remarriage, the court eventually went astray in its inquiry of the issue. It 
rather focused on the issue of reconciliation and cohabitation. The central issue in 
                                                          
131  Worth noting is the legal consequence of a divorce that entails change in the legal status of 
the spouses for all legal purposes. See LOWE & DOUGLAS, supra note 44, at 174-176.  Most legal ef-
fects (rights and obligations) that were once attached to the marital status of the spouses would be 
terminated. For instance, the duty to supply maintenance that is based on affinity relationship comes 
to an end upon divorce. See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art.199. Moreover, the change is the legal 
status needs to be clear to third parties dealing with the spouses so as to avoid an erroneous belief of 
the status of the spouses. Thus, extending the effects to a post-divorce would complicate those legal 
issues. 
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the case would have been whether or not a remarriage had been concluded between 
the ex-spouses after the divorce. Framing such an issue would then call for proof 
of celebration of the alleged remarriage in one of the three modes of celebration 
under the Revised Family Code. The issues of reconciliation and cohabitation, as 
dealt with at length elsewhere in this piece, would rather be ancillary to the inquiry 
of the main issue. Taking the proof of the auxiliary facts, the court rushed to deal 
with the issue of proof of remarriage. Holding that possession of marital status 
could be the appropriate mode of proof for the case at hand, the court skipped the 
initial issue to address whether or not remarriage would be required by the law.  
In so doing, the court essentially reverted to another issue. Both issues are 
quite distinct. The first issue of conclusion of a new marriage (remarriage) is an 
issue of fact that seeks a response based on the necessary evidence. As can be not-
ed from the record, no evidence was adduced in this regard. Even the issue itself 
was overlooked by the FFIC. It is noteworthy that this should have been the issue 
before the lower court as the dissolution of the previous marriage was never con-
tested. In contrast, the second issue of the legal necessity of a remarriage would be 
a question of law as the proper answer for this issue lies in the law itself. Should 
this issue be an issue calling for the legal interpretation, the first issue would be in-
appropriate. The issue would be irrelevant when the legal necessity of remarriage 
itself is rather in question. As indicated below, it is worth noting that the necessity 
of a remarriage would not be an issue calling for a legal interpretation. It can readi-
ly be gleaned from the law that a remarriage can be concluded between ex-spouses 
after the dissolution of a former marriage. Though framing the proper issue is a 
procedural matter, its disposition goes deeper to determine the outcome. As a criti-
cal reflection on the substance of the issue is in order in the next sub-section, it is 
sufficient to note how the court deviated from the issue it framed in its subsequent 
legal reasoning. This would render its legal analysis quite muddled. 
2. No Room for Interpretation  
The other question worth asking is whether there was a need for the legal in-
terpretation of a remarriage. Both issues indicated in the preceding sub-section 
would never call for a legal interpretation. The main issue of the existence or non-
existence of an alleged remarriage would not be regarded as a question of law 
seeking interpretation. It would rather remain a question of fact to be answered in 
the trial court. As such, it would call for the relevant evidence. In the event that the 
issue was not properly framed by the lower court, the role of the Cassation Divi-
sion would then be limited to rectifying the error in framing the issue and remand-
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ing the case back to the trial court. This has been the practice in some cases.
132
 The 
Cassation Division would have done same in the case at hand as the issue so 
framed was never raised in the lower courts. Both the FFIC and the FHC were 
wandering along the margin. The issue before them was whether or not post-
divorce reconciliation/and cohabitation would constitute remarriage. That is, the 
issue was not directly about the (non-)conclusion of a remarriage. Yet, the outcome 
was not far from the one that would result from the proper issue. Compared to the 
issue before the FHC, the issue before FFIC was however limited to proof of post-
divorce cohabitation. It appears that cohabitation was indirectly taken to evidence 
the existence of remarriage.  
The second misconceived issue that would not merit legal interpretation was 
the necessity of conclusion of a remarriage. Driven by its sympathy for the prac-
tice, Cassation Division endeavored oddly to inquire for a remarriage. This was in-
deed quite futile in view of the role and power of the court. The notion or possibil-
ity of remarriage was already contemplated by the Revised Family Code. In 
relation to the period of widowhood, the Revised Family Code makes clear the 
possible conclusion of a remarriage after the expiry of the period.
133
 More im-
portantly, the law even dispenses with the requirement when such a remarriage is 
to be made between ex-spouses.
134
 As conclusion of a (re)marriage in accordance 
with one of the forms is the rule, it is assumed that the legislature did not find ap-
propriate to stipulate a separate rule for a remarriage between ex-spouses.   
A (re)marriage requires a solemn conclusion as prescribed by the law. The ex-
istence of a remarriage between ex-spouses essentially requires the conclusion of a 
new marriage.
135
 Reconciliation of the spouses would not change or supersede the 
requirement that serves a legitimate legal purpose. There is no exception in the law 
for cases involving former spouses. Furthermore, it is not within the ambit of its 
judicial power for the Cassation Division to create a separate rule for a remarriage 
between ex-spouses.  
Thus, it is against the well-established rule of interpretation to resort to a legal 
interpretation when the law is clear. There is no room for interpretation on the is-
sue at hand. Under the guise of interpretation, the court essentially ruled out the re-
quirement of celebration for the conclusion of a remarriage between the ex-
spouses. In so doing, the Cassation Division of the FSC cast a doubt over its judi-
                                                          
132 See e.g, Negasi Ayele v Samuel Yohannes & Manasebesh Beyene, Federal Supreme Court cas-
sation Division, Cass. File No. 46726/2010, 11 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS 42, 42-44(2011)( ruling on, 
inter alia, the need for farming the appropriate issue as to proof of a marriage and deciding the issue 
in light of the relevant evidence). 
133 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 16(1). 
134 Id. Art. 16(2)(b). 
135 Abebawork v Wagaye Case, supra note 70, at para 12.  
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cial mandate in the interpretation of the law. Moreover, the legal ramification of 
such an interpretation would also entail the relegation of a marital status to the lev-
el of cohabitation. 
In sum, it can be concluded that there existed no legitimate room for interpre-
tation of the issues raised by the court. Nor was there a legal necessity for the in-
terpretation of the issues raised in the FFIC and FHC. Rather, the basic errors that 
related to erroneous application and unnecessary legal interpretation were already 
rectified by the appellate division of the FSC.  
3. Incomplete Possession of Marital Status 
The other critical legal issue that was misconstrued is that of possession of 
marital status. This mode of proof is quite vital for determining several legal issues 
stemming from a (re)marriage. It has become a dominant mode of proof due to 
limited instance of the primary mode. It must be borne in mind that proof of a mar-
riage presupposes the conclusion of the marriage. As clearly stated by the law con-
clusion of a marriage requires its celebration in one of the forms. In the issue at 
hand, the court overlooked the necessity of celebration that decisively marks the 
very creation of a remarriage.  
The court focused only on treatment of the ex-spouses as married couple by 
themselves and their community during their cohabitation.
136
  Based on proof of 
these facts alone, the court held that the proof would evidence existence of posses-
sion of marital status as defined under Art 96 of Revised Family Code.
137
 The 
treatment of the ex-spouses as married couple by their family and the celebration 
of the remarriage were both ignored. This can be gleaned from a careful reading of 
the court’s analysis. The proof of possession of marital status was thus incomplete 
as it excluded this decisive element. Indeed, the law itself fails to make an explicit 
mention of the component from among the constitutive elements comprising the 
definition.
138
 As a result, it confuses with that of irregular union.
139
 The loophole in 
the definition of possession of marital status calls for patching from within.
140
  
Indeed, this could have been made complete by way of interpretation in light 
of relevant legal provisions. It is clearly spelt out by the law that conclusion of 
                                                          
136 Id.  at para 12. 
137 Id. 
138 THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 96. 
139 Thus, proof of the similar elements of an irregular union claimed as a marriage may result in 
mistaking the irregular union for a marriage. This would be against the purpose of the law. 
140 Without any further legislative act, the requirement of celebration can be read into the defini-
tion of possession of status through purposive interpretation by the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court. Such an interpretation is quite reasonable and within the ambit of the court’s man-
date of binding legal interpretation. It is not as outrageous as the interpretations of the court in some 
cases.  
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marriage shall be made in the form prescribed by the law, religion or custom con-
cerned.
141
 In all cases, the bottom line is the need for conclusion of the remarriage 
in a certain form. Thus, subsequent proof of a remarriage shall necessarily entail 
proof of its celebration in a certain form.
142
 It is this fundamental element along 
with others that would lead to judicial presumption of conclusion of a remarriage.  
4. Presumption of (Re)marriage Conclusion 
Related to the issue of proof of possession of status is that of the presumption 
of conclusion of the alleged remarriage. The essence of proof of possession of mar-
ital status is the consequent presumption of conclusion of a (re)marriage. As indi-
cated in its reasoning, the court pointed out that the presumption would be opera-
tive upon the establishment of the three facts identified above.
143
 In principle, the 
court should take such a presumption upon convincing proof of possession of 
marital status.
144
 For the presumption of conclusion to be taken, the proof shall be 
complete. The proof must be deemed complete up on the ascertainment of all the 
integral elements including celebration. This can be noted from the stand of the 
FSC in subsequent cases.
145
   
Worth discussing is thus the nexus between celebration of the alleged remar-
riage and the presumption for the latter to be operative. For the obvious reason 
mentioned above, the court did not make even a mention of the link. This is argua-
bly another important legal issue skipped by the court. As celebration is a prerequi-
site for conclusion of a (re)marriage, the presumption of the latter would eventual-
ly depend on proof of the former. That is, proof of celebration of a remarriage must 
be a necessary and decisive element in the proof of the status for the operation of 
the presumption. The presumption is not about the existence of circumstances of a 
remarriage, but its conclusion sometime in the past. As such, the celebration signi-
fies its very creation. Hence, no presumption would operate if its celebration is not 
proved.
146
 The celebration for the dissolved marriage can never be extended be-
yond that marriage to characterize the post-divorce cohabitation as a remarriage.  
                                                          
141 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Arts. 1-4, 25, 26(1), 27(1). 
142 This can be noted from the subsequent decisions of the FSC in which the court endorsed the 
need for proof of celebration of the alleged marriage. See Yeshareg Abatkun v.Mesert Admasu, supra 
note 22. See also Alehegn Mekonnen v. Aster Arahaya, supra note 50.  Despite lack of consistency in 
its jurisprudence, the FSC has noted the necessity of proof of marriage celebration.  Thus, it is argued 
that the same stand should apply for cases of an alleged marriage between ex-spouses after divorce.  
143 Abebawork v Wagaye Case, supra note 70, at para 12. 
144 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 97(1). It is worth noting that the use of the word 
“…may…” must be construed to mean the court would take the presumption only if it is satisfied 
with the evidence for proof of possession of status. As indicated elsewhere, despite misleading word-
ing, the presumption must remain operative once the required standard is met.  
145 See Yeshareg Abatkun v.Mesert Admasu, supra note 22. See also Alehegn Mekonnen v. Aster 
Arahaya, supra note 50. 
146 See supra footnote 142. 
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It should be noted that the presumed fact is conclusion of a (re)marriage, not 
its celebration.
147
 As a rule of evidence dictates, proof of the first fact requires no 
evidence for the presumption would serve the same purpose. In contrast, proof of 
the celebration calls for evidence as it is not the presumed fact. In other words, 
conclusion of a marriage should not be confused with its celebration. Yet, there is a 
logical connection between celebration and conclusion of a (re)marriage. Thus, 
proof of the former fact, inter alia, entails presumption of the latter.
148
 In the case 
at hand, such a distinction was overlooked. Instead, a non-marital cohabitation was 
accorded the status of a remarriage.
149
   
In short, presumption of the conclusion of the remarriage was inferred from 
an incomplete proof of the ostensible possession of status. In effect, a quasi-marital 
union or, more appropriately, the so-called defacto remarriage was judicially creat-
ed. In other jurisdictions, presumption of a (re)marriage may operate so as to give 
legal recognition to a non-marital cohabitation.
150
 Such recognition is necessitated 
due to the absence of the regime of common-law marriage in their jurisdictions.
151
 
The situation in Ethiopia is quite different as an irregular union is maintained with 
equivalent function. 
5. A Letter of Declaration Not Sufficient for Rebuttal 
As judicial presumption of conclusion of a (re)marriage is rebuttable, the 
question is how sufficient should the rebuttal evidence be. This was another legal 
point with no analysis in the decision of the court. At issue was the sufficiency of 
the letter of declaration of non-cohabitation from the kebele administration. In con-
trast to the ruling of the lower court, the Cassation Division found the evidence in-
sufficient to refute the presumption. As any kind of reliable evidence can be pro-
                                                          
147  Though logically and necessarily connected, both facts are not the same. As such, providing 
the presumption of conclusion of a marriage shall not be overstretched to mean presumption of cele-
bration of the marriage in a certain form. 
148 For a presumption based on proof of a certain basic fact such as the one in the case at hand, 
the presumption is created only after the basic fact is sufficiently proved. See Betatek Tadesse, supra 
note 99, at 85. 
149 Courts must be careful not to take cohabitation and repute of being married for inferring pre-
sumption of a marriage. That would result in eroding the strong values inherent in distinctive treat-
ment of a formal marriage from an irregular union. Such a move would open up the door for the prac-
tice in other jurisdictions such the US where a formal marriage is merely reduced to the status of the 
prevailing practice of cohabitations. In those jurisdictions, the significance of a formal marriage itself 
is getting eroded.  See generally Walter O. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage: An Appraisal 
of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV.1 (88), 88-110(1960). 
150 See generally Frank Bates, The Presumption of Marriage Arising from Cohabitation, 13W.  
AUSTL. L. REV. 3(341), 341-353(1978). Yet, the presumption is applicable only as regards the civil 
aspects of the marriage. No such presumption applies where the proof the alleged marriage is re-
quired for determination of a criminal issue in criminal law. Id. at 350. 
151 Id. See also GILLIAN DOUGLAS, supra note 4, at 47-51. 
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duced in rebuttal, such written evidence could be deemed admissible.
152
 At this 
juncture, one may question the relevance and sufficiency of the evidence for dis-
proof of the alleged cohabitation. As a rule, written evidence is considered more 
reliable than oral evidence. Yet, the relevance and credibility of written evidence 
depend on the nature of the fact in issue. Though the reliability or otherwise of a 
certain evidence is ultimately determined by the court, not all facts are appropriate-
ly proved by written evidence. Thus, for the cohabitation, testimonial evidence 
from the community is much more credible than a letter from a kebele administra-
tion. As can be noted from the record, the declaration made by the letter was based 
on the testimony of three witnesses. Since the testimony at the kebele would not be 
subject to a cross-examination before the administrative officer, its credibility 
could be disputed.  The letter, if credible, could still be used to corroborate the tes-
timonial evidence before the court. However, the letter alone could not in itself 
suffice to rebut the presumption.  
This appears to be the reason for the Cassation Division to reject the conten-
tion of the respondent on the issue of cohabitation. In this regard, the ruling of the 
Cassation Division on the issue is not amenable to criticism. Nevertheless, ruling 
on the issue without any legal reasoning as to the insufficiency of the evidence is 
susceptible to criticism.
153
 It is important to note that every ruling along with the 
reasoning of the Cassation Division on a legal issue carries more weight than that 
of lower courts.  The court would be expected to make a ruling on an issue with a 
legal reasoning.
154
 A legal opinion of the court will be a vital obiter dictum to in-
form future decisions of lower courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The rulings and reasoning of the courts except that of the FSC were not based 
on a firm legal basis. The important issues were also overlooked. In particular, the 
issues of the (non-)conclusion of a remarriage after the divorce were sidelined. 
Moreover, unwarranted presumption of conclusion of remarriage was drawn on the 
basis of incomplete proof of possession of status. In this regard, the legal signifi-
cance of proving celebration of a remarriage in a certain form was utterly neglect-
ed. In effect, a post-divorce non-marital cohabitation and reconciliation were erro-
neously regarded to imply the existence of the alleged remarriage. Eventually, an 
                                                          
152 See THE REVISED FAMILY CODE, Art. 97(2). 
153 It is also arguable whether FSC Cassation Division can engage in evaluation of the sufficiency 
of evidence submitted at lower courts except as regards its admissibility or the required degree of 
proof that involves basic error of the relevant law. In one case, the FSC itself has indicated that 
weighing the sufficiency of the evidence submitted in a lower court lies outside the issue that is sub-
ject to cassation review. See Muluworke Watche v. Social Security Agency, supra note 25, at 41. 
154 See Kaldis Link International v. Genet Wondimu, Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, 
Cass. File No.58540/2011, 12 FED. SUP. CT. CASS. DECS 326, 326-328(2011). 
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irregular union was rather mistaken for a remarriage. In so doing, several legal is-
sues were misconstrued even in the cassation decision.  
Therefore, it is quite compelling to revisit the precedent so tainted with seri-
ous legal flaws to guide future cases in light of the law. Celebration of a 
(re)marriage shall be considered essential in the proof of possession of marital sta-
tus to draw a valid presumption of conclusion of the (re)marriage. Some recent de-
cisions of the Cassation Division of the FSC confirm the need for proving the cel-
ebration of a marriage. This practice must be maintained consistently to govern 
proof of a (re)marriage. In particular, the subsequent precedent that is apparently 
set for proof of a former marriage must be applied to cases of alleged remarriage 
between ex-spouses. Another important point is the consequence of divorce that 
changes the legal status of the spouses. The change in the legal status must not be 
neglected. No post-divorce cohabitation short of celebration of a remarriage can be 
accorded the legal status of a remarriage. As such, the distinction between a 
(re)marriage and an irregular union shall be kept unclouded. Courts should be care-
ful not to deviate from clear legal rules. If deviation is so desired, that can only be 
done by the legislator. A justified resort to the default mode of proof must be treat-
ed so narrowly. Otherwise, there remains no incentive to obtain (re)marriage certif-
icate for the purpose. 
 
 
 
 
